

# TS/NOFORN



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Welcome to the keynote circuit  
– I thought that's where old  
people like me go to die? ;)

- Halvar Flake, Oct.14 2014



# STAR WARS




# OFFENDERS



# DEFENDERS

# SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY





**SOPHISTICATED  
WEAPONRY  
WITH  
SUPERPOWERS**



MICKEY MOUSE DEATH STAR



# ~~STAR WARS~~ CYBER

- YOU DON'T SEE YOUR ADVERSARY
- YOU DON'T KNOW WHOSE DEATH STAR IT IS THERE ON YOUR MACHINE
- YOU PROBABLY WON'T EVEN FIND THE DEATH STAR ON YOUR MACHINE

# Cyber!

- INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BEING STOLEN
- POLITICAL OPPONENTS PUT TO JAIL
- INTERNET COMMUNICATION BEING BLOCKED
- VENDOR FINDING A NEW EXPLOIT
- SAME TIME, HACKER WRITES 5 MORE
- CONTROL OF MEDIA
- ENTERPRISES LOOSING CUSTOMER DATA
- NATION STATES SPYING ON THEIR CITIZENS
- NATION STATES BEING HACKED
- LITTLE PAUL LOOSING HIS HOMEWORK



# FAIRYTALE

# SUSPECT #1

- FILESIZE:192512
- COMPILETIME: 2010:05:06
- C&C: CALLIENTEFEVER.INFO
- HTTP ACCEPT-LANGUAGE: FR

```
push offset aHttpCallientef ; "http://callientefever.info/img/new
push offset aNotifurl ; "NotifUrl"
mov     eax, ebp
mov     [esp+1954h+var_1938], ebp
call   AddConfParam
push   offset aHttpCallient_0 ; "http://callientefever.info/img/new
push   offset aSyncurl ; "SyncUrl"
mov     eax, ebp
call   AddConfParam
push   offset aTfc_config_key ; "TFC_Config_Key"
push   ebp
mov     ebx, offset aSoftwareMicr_0 ; "Software\\Microsoft\\Net3D"
call   AddConfParam2
push   offset aTfc_configig_na ; "TFC_Configig_Name"
push   ebp
mov     ebx, offset aConfig ; "Config"
call   AddConfParam2
call   QueryTFCKey
lea    esi, [esp+194Ch+var_1934]
mov     edx, offset a1_506 ; "1.506"
mov     [esp+194Ch+var_1934], 0
call   GetLength_mb
```

# SUSPECT #1

- DYNAMIC API LOADING  
BY NAME HASH

```
for (i=0; i<expcount; i++) {  
    exp_len = strlen(exports[i]);  
    temp = 0;  
    result = 0xAB34CD77;  
    for (j=0; j<exp_len; j++) {  
        temp = (rotl(temp,7) ^ exports[i][j]);  
    }  
    result ^= temp;  
    result ^= 0xAB34CD77;  
    printf("%08x\n", result, exports[i]);  
}
```

# SUSPECT #1

PING

EXEC

HTTPF

ASPFLOOD

TCPFLOOD

WEBFLOOD

POSTFLOOD

ATCLEAR

STATISTICS

KILL

SET

UPLOAD

UPDATE

PLUGIN

FLOODING ALL  
THE THINGS

# SUSPECT #1





**OMIG!!!**



# SUSPECTS #[2-4]

- |  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| • FILESIZE:<br>184320                          | • FILESIZE:<br>184320                          | • FILESIZE:<br>792064                                 |
| • CODESIZE:<br>139264                          | • CODESIZE:<br>139264                          | • CODESIZE:<br><b>583680</b>                          |
| • COMPILETIME:<br>2010:02:16<br>18:05:54+01:00 | • COMPILETIME:<br>2010:03:11<br>17:55:03+01:00 | • COMPILETIME:<br><b>2011:10:25</b><br>20:28:39+01:00 |

# SUSPECT #4

- FILESIZE: 792064
- COMPILETIME: 2011:10:25 20:28:39+01:00
- API NAME HASHING KEY AB34CD77H
- HTTP://1.9.32.11/BUNNY/TEST.PHP?REC=NVISTA

ANTI-ANALYSIS | THREADS & FILES | CPU DATA | C&C COMMANDS | LUA

```
.rdata:001A47E0 ; char aRb_0[]
.rdata:001A47E0 aRb_0 db 'rb',0 ; DATA XREF: FseekStuff+EF10
.rdata:001A47E3 align 4
.rdata:001A47E4 aSelfdir_tmpdat db '%SELFDIR%\_tmpdat',0
.rdata:001A47F6 align 4
.rdata:001A47F8 aSelfdirPerfl_2 db '%%SELFDIR%%\Perflib_Perfdata_42%i.dat',0
.rdata:001A47F8 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A481E align 10h
.rdata:001A4820 aSelfdirPerfl_1 db '%%SELFDIR%%\Perflib_Perfdata_41%i.dat',0
.rdata:001A4820 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A4846 align 4
.rdata:001A4848 aSelfdirPerfl_3 db '%%SELFDIR%%\Perflib_Perfdata_43%i.dat',0
.rdata:001A4848 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A486E align 10h
.rdata:001A4870 aSelfdirPerfl_4 db '%%SELFDIR%%\Perflib_Perfdata_44%i.dat',0
.rdata:001A4870 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A4896 align 4
.rdata:001A4898 aS0 db '%s0',0 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A489C aU3gr6bZ2c_0 db 'U3gr6B&Z2c',0 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A48A7 align 4
.rdata:001A48A8 aU3gr6bZ2c_1 db 'U3gr6B&Z2c',0 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A48B3 align 4
.rdata:001A48B4 aU3gr6bZ2c db 'U3gr6B&Z2c',0 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A48BF align 10h
.rdata:001A48C0 aU3gr6bZ2c_2 db 'U3gr6B&Z2c',0 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A48CB align 4
.rdata:001A48CC a0123456789abcd db '0123456789ABCDEF',0 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A48DD align 1
.rdata:001A48E0 aAbcdefghijklmn db 'BCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz',0 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A48E0 ; DATA XREF: WriteToPerfdata+1
.rdata:001A4921 align 4
```



**NOT FUNNY.**

# SUSPECT #4

AV PRODUCT ENUMERATION

```
SELECT * FROM ANTIVIRUSPRODUCT
```


FIREWALL PRODUCT ENUMERATION

```
SELECT * FROM FIREWALLPRODUCT
```

SANDBOX CHECK

```
"KLAVME", "MYAPP", "TESTAPP",  
"AFYJEVMV.EXE", TIMING CONDITION
```

# SUSPECT #4




# SUSPECT #4

- CONFIG STORED IN HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\IPSEC
- [HTTP://LE-PROGRES.NET/IMAGES/PHP/TEST.PHP?REC=11206-01](http://LE-PROGRES.NET/IMAGES/PHP/TEST.PHP?REC=11206-01)
- [HTTP://GHATREH.COM/SKINS/PHP/TEST.PHP?REC=11206-01](http://GHATREH.COM/SKINS/PHP/TEST.PHP?REC=11206-01)
- [HTTP://WWW.USTHB-DZ.ORG/INCLUDES/PHP/TEST.PHP?REC=11206-01](http://WWW.USTHB-DZ.ORG/INCLUDES/PHP/TEST.PHP?REC=11206-01)

# SUSPECT #4

Advanced  
Command  
and Script  
Parsing



# SUSPECT #4

Advanced  
Command  
and Script  
Parsing

4 WORKER THREADS

EXECUTING LUA SCRIPTS

LUA 5.1 + C/INVOKE CODE

CALLBACK FROM LUA TO C++



GETCONFIG

FTPPUT

FTPGET

SENDFILE

GETFILE

UNINSTALL

RESTARTHEARER

RESTART

CLEANHEARER

# SUSPECT #4

CRONTASKA

CRONTASKR

CRONTASKL

MAXPOSTDATA

SETURL

STOP

SETCPULIMIT

TIMEOUT

WAITFOR

UPDATEDIETIME

# Analyzing CVE-2011-4369 – Part One

by [admin](#) · December 20, 2011 · [Uncategorized](#)

Adobe pulled a fast one a couple days ago when they pushed out their most recent patch. In doing so they addressed CVE-2011-2462, but also mentioned another vulnerability that exploited the PRC format (also related to U3D). This additional vulnerability was not one I had come across until a few days ago and below is my initial analysis of the PDF structure, and barebones dynamic analysis.

<https://www.pdfxray.com/interact/e6db130bb8768a5f65e7e52aa235e66e/>

## Structure Breakdown

This PDF does not make use of any encryption or advanced capabilities, but does have an interesting structure. The document itself consists on 17 pages which is a key fact to note because it is later used by the JavaScript. These pages are defined in object 1 with pages 8-11 being those that reference the PRC streams.

Located within the last object (64) is the JavaScript triggered to run when the document is opened (JS is contents for the first page) which will be analyzed later. Located throughout the document are several objects containing a stream that defines PRC content.

The first file dropped on to the system is “AcroRd32Info.cab” which is then expanded using “C:WINDOWSsystem32expand.exe” that writes “acrord32info.exe”. VirusTotal identifies this file as a generic dropper, but does not provide any malware family.

<http://www.virustotal.com/file-scan/report.html?id=c6a182f410b4cda0665cd792f0...>

After writing to “C:WINDOWSsystem32wbemLogswbemprox.log” another file is written to “C:WINDOWSmsappsnetmgr.exe”. VirusTotal identifies this file as an injector, but again, does not provide any malware family. Before the main process is terminated a registry value is set so that “netmgr.exe” runs when the system starts.

<http://www.virustotal.com/file-scan/report.html?id=be14d781b85125a60747249646...>

Running “netmgr.exe” manually creates a process and executes svchost.exe which waits for a few seconds and then terminates. Within the “netmgr.exe” are references to “http://1.9.32.11/bunny/test.php?rec=nvista”, but it is unclear what role, if any, this site plays. Part two will include more analysis on the binary files dropped by the PDF.

## Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2011-4369

Original release date: 12/16/2011

Last revised: 01/29/2013

Source: US-CERT/NIST

# SUSPECT #5


- FILESIZE: 966144
- CODESIZE: 128512
- COMPILETIME: 2011:10:25 19:28:00+01:00
- DROPPER FOR SUSPECT #4
- SAME C&Cs AS SUSPECT #4

# SUSPECT #5

## ACRORD32INFO.EXE

Location	Remote Host	Port Number
Oakville, Canada	69.90.160.65	80
Montréal, Canada	70.38.107.13	80
Montréal, Canada	70.38.12.10	80

<http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=c40e3ee23cf95d992b7cd0b7c01b8599>



**SRSRY?**



# BUNNY SHOOTER

v 2.3.2

# SUSPECT #5

- DROPS PAYLOAD IN %WINDIR%\MSAPPS\NETMGR.EXE
- STORES CONFIGURATION IN REGISTRY
- CREATES ENTRY IN  
HKLM\..\CURRENTVERSION\RUN FOR NETMGR.EXE
- REACHES OUT TO REMOTE SERVERS



# SWISS CHEESE ATTRIBUTION



- PROJECT NAMED BUNNY, VERSION 2.3.2
- DDoS BOTNET OPERATORS
- ACCEPT-LANGUAGE: FR
- C&C SERVERS HOSTED IN CANADA
- C&C DOMAINS RESEMBLE FRENCH/IRANIAN WEBSITES
- AUTHOR NO ENGLISH NATIVE-SPEAKER ...
- LUA? MUST BE FLAME





**Wars not make  
one great.**



OPEN  
whispersystems

# Security, simplified.


Open Source security for mobile devices.

<https://whispersystems.org/>



Open Garden  
You are the Internet

SUBGRAPH OS  
<https://subgraph.com/>





# BetterCrypto.org

Applied Crypto Hardening

*Collaborative*

**RCE Tool**

**Library**

[HTTP://WWW.WOODMANN.COM/COLLABORATIVE/TOOLS/INDEX.PHP/CATEGORY:RCE\\_TOOLS](http://www.woodmann.com/collaborative/tools/index.php/category:rce_tools)

[HTTP://WWW.WOODMANN.COM/COLLABORATIVE/KNOWLEDGE/INDEX.PHP/CATEGORY:RCE\\_KNOWLEDGE](http://www.woodmann.com/collaborative/knowledge/index.php/category:rce_knowledge)

# VIPERS

*Time to do malware research right.*

**Viper** is a *binary management and analysis framework* dedicated to malware and exploit researchers.

<http://viper.li/>

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


- MR. WHITE, MR. ORANGE, MR. BLONDE & MR. PINK
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- INBAR RAZ
- NICOLAS BRULEZ
- @EMERGENCYKITTENS



# Thank you!

Marion Marschalek  
@pinkflawd  
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Will help build  
battle station  
for food 

# ANALYZE IT

- 2A64D331964DBDEC8141F16585F392BA
- 40E0F0681C79D70AC0329E68A94294CB
- 8132EE00F64856CF10930FD72505CEBE
- E8A333A726481A72B267EC6109939B0D
- 3BBB59AFDF9BDA4FFDC644D9D51C53E7
- C40E3EE23CF95D992B7CD0B7C01B8599